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Abstract
This article is a review of the contemporary ‘leftist’ republican project. The 
project stands on two legs, and we examine them both in turn. The first leg is a 
novel reading of history. This reading suggests, on the one hand that, contrary 
to some popular assumptions, republicanism does have a leftist, even a radical 
stream. But on the other hand, it also suggests that several authors and move-
ments that did not self-identify as republicans actually did, in fact, employ a 
characteristically republican thinking. The second leg of the project is a nor-
mative one. It is essentially an attempt by political philosophers to demonstrate 
that there is something in republican theory from which all these leftist, even 
radical streams spring forth. Primarily, it is suggested that it is republicanism’s 
sensitivity to the freedom-restricting role of great inequalities of power that 
provides the normative resource for the development of a characteristically 
republican critique of capital and capitalism. We briefly review the main argu-
ments in favor of these claims, and also, as a conclusion, raise a few challenges 
that the ‘leftist’ republican project potentially faces.
Keywords: republicanism, domination, socialism, Marx, trade unions 
Introduction
Republicanism is a rich and rather diverse tradition. Its links to elitist, even 
aristocratic politics are fairly well known – you might think of Cicero and the 
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patrician republicans of Rome, some of the early modern English revolutionar-
ies, but also the American Founding Fathers. Less well known however is that 
republicanism has a “leftist” tradition, also – into which, arguably, you might 
include the Roman plebeians, as well as Machiavelli, Rousseau, perhaps Marx, 
certain trade unions from 19th century America and others. And in fact (in 
modern times at least), many on this “leftist” side have employed the language 
of republicanism to no less a political aim, but the radical critique of capitalism, 
the transformation of labor and the like. For if freedom is to be attained then 
perhaps “there is to be a people in industry, as in government” (Lloyd 1963, 
183). But how is this possible? How can a tradition so famously linked to elitism 
also be used as a weapon against capital? What is there in republican theory that 
may explain this phenomenon? In the past years, considerable effort has been 
put into answering these questions by a number of authors such as Alex Goure-
vitch, Bruno Leipold, James Muldoon, Karma Nabulsi, Tom O’Shea, Michael J. 
Thompson, Nicholas Vrousalis, and Stuart White. In this review we provide a 
short sketch of their overall project. First, drawing on mainstream contemporary 
historiography, we set the outlines of what is usually counted as ‘republicanism’ 
in the first place, and what may interest leftists from that. Second and third, we 
briefly introduce two better known candidates for ‘anti-capitalist republicanism’, 
namely the already mentioned trade unions on the one hand, and Karl Marx 
on the other. Fourth, we turn to the normative level of the issue, and discuss 
possible republican concerns about capitalism. The essence of these concerns is 
that capitalism is a system characterized by relations of dominating power – and 
since republicans are opposed to domination in general, they should be opposed 
to capitalism too. Fifth and finally, we place the project in its wider discursive 
framework, and ask whether the contemporary left has anything new to gain 
from the republican revival, and also whether this revival really has, as some 
suggest, a polemic edge against so-called mainstream liberalism.
1. What is Republicanism?
So, what is it? Contemporary republicanism is a movement of revival, name-
ly the revival of a tradition that spans thousands of years, but one that has expe-
rienced an eclipse at a certain point in the 19th century, giving way to liberalism, 
conservatism, and socialism. Indeed, this eclipse has for some time determined 
the points of reference for historical research too – republicanism, simply put, 
was often seen as a form of proto-liberalism rather than a tradition sui gener-
is. But this assertion has been seriously questioned ever since the 1970s and 
80s, essentially by historians linked to the so-called Cambridge School: J. G. A. 
Pocock (Pocock 1975), but also his students, most notably Quentin Skinner. 
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According to them, a distinct republican tradition does exist, with figures ar-
guably included figures such as Aristotle, Cicero, the brothers Gracchus, Livy, 
Polybius, Machiavelli from renaissance Italy, English and American revolution-
aries, or supporters of the revolutions such as Harrington, Sidney, Milton, the 
Founding Fathers, all the way to Montesquieu, Rousseau, and Hannah Arendt. 
But the list keeps getting longer and longer still. Followers (and indeed, critics) 
of Skinner have stipulated that several others may also be counted republican: 
the levellers, the diggers, Locke, Spinoza, Hegel, Marx, even Hayek (Irving 2020; 
Leipold 2020; Bohman 2010; Prokhovnik 2004; Herold 2013). What do they 
all have in common that may arguably tie them into a tradition? According to 
Skinner, Pettit, and others, at least, the main common characteristic is the belief 
that hierarchy, great inequality of power, or as is commonly put, domination, 
is an offence against liberty itself. This is certainly something that liberals for 
their part would never accept: their assertion is that liberty requires immunity 
not from domination, but rather immunity form interference only. In the liberal 
mind, the characteristic barrier to freedom is the law (which interferes, permits, 
forbids, or sanctions). Not so in the republican mind. The latter claims that in-
terference (say, the law) per se is not necessarily a barrier to freedom, but only if 
it also dominates – for instance, if the law-making process is dominated by an 
elite, and if everyone doesn’t have equal power, or an equal say in it. However, if 
everybody does have an equal say, then regardless of its interfering nature, the 
law is in fact not a barrier to freedom, but rather an expression of the autono-
mous will of the political community.
This sensitivity to the freedom-restricting role of hierarchies is also primar-
ily what makes republicanism interesting to the left. Another element that does 
so is its purportedly solid democratic potential (see: Leipold–Nabulsi–White, 
2020). Contemporary republicans, not much unlike communitarians 20 or 
30 years ago, tend to suggest that liberals partially have themselves to blame 
for the crisis of civic virtue, community, and the democratic ethos. In a nut-
shell, liberal freedom will not do as a basis for any of these things, at the end of 
the day because of its insensitivity to domination. Logically speaking at least, 
non-interference does not require democracy – in theory, it may be provided 
by a benevolent autocrat too. So, what then do you need virtue and commu-
nity for? Non-domination is different, however. The specific sort of power re-
lation that it implies simply cannot be attained without everybody having an 
equal say. It is, therefore, logically linked to democracy, and thus to a somewhat 
perfectionist stance towards issues of virtue-cultivation as well. Aside from the 
domination-element, contemporary leftist republicans commonly draw on this 
assumption too. They argue, in effect, that republicanism is a useful tool for the 
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justification of traditionally leftist policies such as, say, workplace democracy. 
But this is something we will not get into in detail here. Our focus is on the 
domination element.
2.Radicalizing the Heritage: 19th Century Labor Republicanism
What of the historical record, then? To be sure, in order to elaborate the 
contours of a new, ‘labor’ republicanism, or any kind of opposition to capital 
for that matter, modern republicans needed to get rid of some of the historical 
residua. Republicanism had a strong elitist and aristocratic stream ever since 
Graeco-roman antiquity. According to this, only those were to be considered 
fully sui juris (their own masters) who did not have to deal with (coerced) labor, 
neither as “slaves by nature”, nor as “slaves by habit”. However, the independence 
of “leisured gentlemen” (Leo Strauss), including their free engagement in public 
life, presupposed the mass dependence upon slaves. This was seen as natural by 
many republican thinkers and politicians since Sallust and Cicero all the way to 
the 19th century. ‘Leisure’ required wealth – that is to say, the possibility not to 
have to work. Wealth was commonly perceived as wealth in land. But land needs 
to be worked – and if not by the gentlemen themselves, then who else, but the 
slaves? Again, reasoning such as this were widely considered natural.
Of course, the elitist stream was never the only one, and even within the elit-
ist stream certain alternatives existed. In a way, all the modern revolutions that 
were opposed to absolute monarchy or to colonial government, had a republi-
can and even “leftist” nuance, at least comparatively speaking. Rosa Luxemburg 
even went as far as to state that “every socialist is naturally a republican” (as cited 
by Muldoon 2019, 4). It is also true that pre-capitalist forms of (namely, usurers’ 
and merchants) capital were sometimes subjected to republican critique, albeit 
in a mediated way, through the critique of corruption and especially luxury. 
Virtue and commerce were commonly understood by republicans to be at odds 
with one another in potentia. But much more interesting to us are those republi-
can ideas and practices that were somehow opposed to capital itself, either in the 
spirit of Arbeiterbewegung, or as a critique of its abstract aspects within mature 
capitalism.
On a more theoretical level, labor republicans such as the Knights of Labor 
attempted to do what many in modernity (say, pro-market republicans also) 
had already attempted before them: the universalization of republican freedom. 
This was certainly not an easy thing to do. If freedom really did require a degree 
of wealth, not to mention leisure time, then some practical solution needed to 
be devised that would provide for everyone what slavery had provided for the 
few (Gourevitch 2015). Their solution was the ‘republicanizing’ of labor. Prac-
tically speaking, this meant pretty much the same thing that any old socialist 
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would have meant by ‘socializing’ at the time: worker ownership over the means 
of production, the equalizing of property etc. But nevertheless, the republican 
argument justifying these practices had a characteristic twist to it. It stated that 
what was wrong with wage labor was precisely its freedom-restricting nature: 
wage-laborers and capital owners’ stand in an unequal relation of power, with 
the latter dominating the former. Therefore, wage labor was merely a new, albeit 
voluntary form of slavery – an instrument of economic subjection and servi-
tude. Arguably, workers were forced to make a contract with their employers, 
as economic need compelled them to sell their labor. As George McNeil put it, 
workers “assent but they do not consent, they submit but do not agree” (as cited 
by Gourevitch 2020). They are, therefore, free only in a formal sense. And the 
end result of the whole process is, of course, unequal control over productive 
activity (employees have to obey), exploitation and the like. All the results of a 
domination-issue.
Now, labor republicans did not necessarily criticize the essential profit-max-
imizing logic of capital. Perhaps they only hoped that in the cooperative com-
monwealth “laborer and capitalist will be one” and expropriators will be expro-
priated, without getting rid of the abstract self-valorization of capital itself. They 
put the accent on dependent and enslaved classes, and not on abstract social 
mechanisms. To put it differently, they often understood domination as a mere 
Klassenbeziehung-issue, that is to say, as the personal or group domination of 
selfish – and sometimes even cruel – capitalists (to which they opposed their 
“higher morality” and work ethic), but ignored some of the more structural 
forms of power.
3. Was Marx a Republican?
As we mentioned, though, the ongoing reinterpretation of the republican 
tradition by historians does not only include efforts to uncover its ‘leftist’ side, 
but also efforts to point to certain closet republicans too, so to speak – republi-
cans who do not or did not know what they actually were. Possible candidates 
are many: Locke, Spinoza, Hegel, but certainly, the most important figure for 
the left in this case, as usual, is Karl Marx. Quentin Skinner himself suggests 
that Marx employed a neo-Roman (or republican) vocabulary when he spoke 
of wage-slavery, alienation, or the dictatorship of the proletariat (Marshall–
Skinner 2020). But Skinner is far from being alone with his contention. It is 
now widely speculated that Marx not only made use of neo-Roman rhetorical 
tropes, but was also inspired by certain 18th and 19th century American, English 
and French labor republicans – for example, he relied on the work of Thomas 
Hamilton, a former colonel, and thus, in a mediated way, on the work Thomas 
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Skidmore, and Owenism also (Gourevitch 2020; Hunt 1974; Isaac 1990). Fur-
ther, as Norman Arthur Fisher highlights, Marx also drew on Lewis Henry Mor-
gan’s research on Roman and Greek republicanism, as well as on his research 
on simpler versions of tribal and clan democracy (Fischer 2015, 30–32). One 
might wonder whether we can characterize Marx’s theory as ‘radical republi-
can’ (or perhaps as “German communitarian”) in nature, at least in some of its 
phases. It is sometimes highlighted that Marx relied on some of the (purported) 
classics of republicanism too, such as Machiavelli, the advocate of civic virtue, 
Rousseau the supporter of the non-representative self-legislation of the people, 
and of course Hegel, who affirmed the public ethics of Sittlichkeit (Thompson 
2015, 1–21). Detailed interpretations are few, however. Perhaps two of the most 
important are the works of William Clare Roberts on the one hand, and Bruno 
Leipold on the other. Roberts essentially draws attention to how Marx criticized 
dominating, freedom-restricting power in capitalism (Roberts 2017). Indeed, 
it may be pointed out that by emphasizing the importance of extractive power 
and surplus benefits within capitalism, Marx explicitly described the relations 
implied by wage-labor as a type of enslavement. “The Roman slave was held by 
chains; the wage-laborer is bound to his owner by invisible threads. The appear-
ance of independence is maintained by a constant change in the person of the 
individual employer, and by the legal fiction of a contract” (Marx 1977, 719). But 
Roberts touches upon something else too. He claims that in fact, Marx’s critique 
of the more abstract forces of domination also has a republican twist to it – that 
is to say, the critique of the profit-maximizing logic which dominates capitalist 
and wage-laborer alike. Arguably, even the analysis of fetishism is an account of 
impersonal domination (in the republican sense) and reification in which the 
abstract aspects of value are falsely represented as the intrinsic value of things 
(Roberts 2017, 52–85.).
 Leipold on the other hand focuses primarily on the vocabulary and the 
democratic credentials of Marx’s theory (Leipold 2020). True, Marx was very 
critical of modern (bourgeois) republics for their neglect of social emancipa-
tion. It is pointed out by authors other than Leipold as well (for instance, by 
Isaac 1990) that Marx was certainly critical of the anachronistic and farcical 
resuscitation of “Roman costumes” and the empty appraisal of old public vir-
tues (or the ‘republican’ critique of corruption too) as being incapable of deal-
ing with the challenges of modern market society, class struggles, and forms of 
“emancipated slavery”. He also emphasized that in a merely political republic 
(as advocated by classical republicans) the material well-being of the remaining 
subsystems (economy, legality, etc.) is not ensured and this kind of government 
is simply unable to face the abstract forces and structural determinations of the 
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capitalist society. To put it simply, Marx criticized the ideology of political re-
publicanism and patriotism (for instance, that of the Young Hegelians) as being 
full of illusions, and he did this from the perspective of a more general human 
emancipation, accentuating that in a bourgeois republic, there still is a dominat-
ing class, and a bureaucracy too, for that matter).
But perhaps Marx was, at the same time, offering a characteristically repub-
lican critique of these republics too – so argues Leipold. It is one thing that as a 
young political publicist he refused all kinds of monarchy and established priv-
ilege and supported political ideas such as popular sovereignty and universal 
suffrage instead. But Leipold suggests that Marx’s later positive theory also bears 
the marks of some form of republicanism – and arguing in favor of this thesis 
he presents, primarily, the famous pamphlet on the Paris Commune. In it, Marx 
explicitly advocates a ‘real republic’, a ‘social republic’, one where public offi-
cials have short-termed and imperative mandates, where they are easy to recall, 
where the legislative branch has primacy, where administrative and repressive 
functions (such as the army and the police) are controlled by the people and so 
on. To repeat then, Leipold argues that it is the democratic element which makes 
Marx’s positive theory republican in a way.
What conclusions are to be drawn from all this is, of course, up for debate? 
We briefly return to this in the concluding section of our review. But, of course, 
the question is rather complicated. For instance, pace Arendt, was Marx trying 
not to end Western political thought after all, but on the contrary, was he trying 
to criticize capitalism with his own purported republican insights in the back-
ground? Was he really attempting to formulate a ‘red’ or ‘social republicanism’ 
in opposition to other forms of republicanism? (Isaac) Or was his engagement 
with republicanism, and indeed, with democracy, merely of a tactical character 
instead? (Mager 1984; Honneth 2017, 45, 129–130, 135–136, 170–171).
4. Forms of Capitalist Domination: Concrete and Abstract
Leaving aside debates on history, however, contemporary ‘leftist’ republi-
canism is a normative project also. We now return to this aspect of it. To re-
call, proponents of the project argue, albeit in somewhat various ways, that the 
primary reason republicans ought to be worried about capitalism is that it is 
characterized by dominating power relations. So, if republicans are to be true to 
their word and wish to curb all sorts of domination, then they certainly ought to 
be critical not merely of the public (thus, state-related) forms of domination, but 
of its private or economic forms also. But what does this mean specifically? We 
suggest that republican concerns may be divided into two categories: concerns 
about concrete domination on the one hand and concerns about more abstract 
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sorts of domination on the other. We examine these in turn and also present 
some of the possible antidotes that republicans tend to offer against them. What, 
then, of the various forms of domination? First, ‘leftist’ republicans speak of 
concrete relations within the workplace itself. These relations are obviously 
dominating, say, if relative power between employer and employee is so uneven 
that the latter may lose his/her job because of a Facebook comment, but also, 
if workers are denied suitable protection from harm or even bathroom breaks. 
But such things are perhaps merely consequences. The underlying issue is this: 
in private companies, power exercised within the organizational structure of 
the workplace always has a more or less asymmetric relation, with wage-lab-
orers being potentially at the mercy of their bosses. The means of production 
are not the property of workers. The work process itself is supervised and reg-
ulated by those who belong to a higher level in the hierarchy of the factory. 
The product produced by the laborer appears as an “alien essence”. Finally, the 
benefits of work are extracted – there is, thus, unilateral exploitation, extractive 
domination, unequal and unreciprocated exchange. Imperatives and servitude 
within this field of “private government” are emphatically embodied in personal 
commandments and personal dependence (Wood 2016; Arneson 2016; Roemer 
1982; Reiman 1987, 3-41). Most contemporary ‘leftist’ republicans would solve 
issues of domination within the workplace either by workplace democracy, or 
workplace constitutionalism, or perhaps some combination of the two. Thus, 
they argue in favor of employees having a say in company matters and/or for 
laws protecting worker interests (Dagger 2006; Gourevitch 2016; Gonzalez-Ri-
coy; McIvor 2009; Petit 2006; Petit 2007; Hsieh 2005; Anderson 2005). A second 
kind of concrete domination, nevermind relation within the workplace itself, 
is when the distribution of resources is radically unequal in the market. Given 
such conditions, the labor contract may never be considered fair: employers 
and capitalists have a far better bargaining position than those looking for work. 
This regulary has as a consequence low wages, uncompensated dangers in the 
workplace for and the like (Thompson 2013, 287;  Vrousalis 2016). What’s more, 
certain republicans go even so far as to suggest that inequalities of resource in 
the market may be detrimental to freedom even if there is no prospect of a labor 
contract. As Vrousalis argues, if these inequalities are so severe that some actors 
may arbitrarily control the conditions of transactions, say, between indepen-
dent enterpreneurs too, then we have enough reason to assume that relations 
are somewhat dominated (Vrousalis 2020). Neither workplace democracy, nor 
constitutionalism solve related issues in any way. Thus, ‘leftist’ republicans offers 
several further solutions: state intervention, redistribution, basic income, or 
more radically, the abolition of private property.
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Third, many republicans suggest that domination may manifest itself in an 
abstract form as well. Most notably, in capitalism all actors are affected, rich and 
poor, worker and capiatlist alike, by the abstract logic of profit maximization. 
This logic orients the lives of nearly all. As Marx suggests, “[t]he capitalist is just 
as enslaved by the capitalist relationship as is his opposite pole” (Marx 1977, 
990) (this is why some thinkers, such as Roberts (Roberts 2017, 103), argue that 
the wage-laborer is the “slave of a slave”). Regardless of the behavior of concrete 
agents, their structural agential dispositions and opportunity sets (Lovett 2010; 
Rahman 2017, 47-49; Schuppert 2015, 440-455), can a priori be described as de-
pendency and servitude – as something that serves the abstract self-valorization 
and reproduction of value and capital as an end-in-itself. As Moishe Postone 
formulates it by relying upon Marx’s analysis, “the form of social domination 
that characterizes capitalism is not ultimately a function of private property, of 
the ownership by the capitalists of the surplus product and the means of pro-
duction; rather, it is grounded in the value form of wealth itself, a form of social 
wealth that confronts living labor (the workers) as a structurally alien and dom-
inant power” (Postone 1993, 30). Similarly, Robert Kurz in his Domination with-
out a Subject tells us that “even the rulers are ruled; in actuality, they never rule 
for their own needs or wellbeing, but for something that is simply transcendent. 
In this they always harm themselves and achieve something alien and obviously 
superficial. Their alleged appropriation of wealth is transformed into self-muti-
lation” (Kurz 2020).
According to his theoretical framework, the structural objectivity of dom-
ination surpasses the existing subjects, and this is especially true in the case 
of mature capitalism when the domination of man by man becomes less and 
less important. Kurz carefully makes a distinction between the outdated bour-
geois-enlightened concept of domination and the abstract concept of domina-
tion that fits the 21st century better, where capitalist relations are more and more 
subjectless and automated.
The profit-maximizing logic is not being manufactured by some ‘ruling class’, 
however. On the contrary, capital, as Robert Kurz put it, is an ‘automated sub-
ject’ (Kurz 2020; cf. Thompson 2015, 287). Here again, moderate ‘leftist’ repub-
licans wish to deal with problems related to this through state intervention, re-
distribution, or perhaps the introduction of a basic income scheme (Birnbaum, 
Casassas 2008). All of these measures are intended to provide the opportunity 
not to have to work, that is, and to be exempt from the need to maximize profit. 
The radical take a step further and claim that as long as there is private property 
in the economy, domination is here to stay (Vrousalis 2019, 5-11). Some say that 
true republican freedom may only be attained in socialism (O’Shea 2019, 8-9). 
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What these radicals suggest is that the social system preferable to capitalism is 
certainly not one in which the laborer becomes the capitalist. Rather, it is one 
that breaks up with capital altogether (for otherwise, subsumption to abstract 
value still remains). For as Vrousalis puts it, “capitalist domination can conceiv-
ably survive the removal of capitalists” (Vrousalis 2013, 157).
Fourth and finally, ‘leftists’ regularly suggest that domination may have an 
ideological variant also. This is something that has been widely debated in Marx-
ist theory (Eagleton 1991; cf. Žižek 1994). For our purposes it is important that 
it is even debated whether this sort of domination is to be counted concrete or 
abstract. Is there a ruling class that indoctrinates? Or is ideology something 
that is being reproduced in some other way? Whatever the case may be, the es-
sential point is this: in capitalist societies, through a string of systematized and 
routinized actions, human beings internalize a set of views supporting the hier-
archical order (Thompson 2015, 284-6; cf. Muldoon 2019, 2020). This process 
has its advantages and its disadvantages too. The main advantage is that it molds 
human beings into functional members of society. The disadvantage is that it 
potentially legitimizes exploitation and hierarchy and presents capitalism as a 
natural rather than a historic phenomenon. There are two ways in which ideo-
logical domination may be conceived as a domination proper. On the one hand, 
human beings do not have full control, in fact, many have very little control, 
over the process in which dominant views are formed and rehearsed, and on 
the other, the consequence of the whole process is precisely the strengthening of 
hierarchies, and the weakening of the prospects of opposition to them.
To sum up, normatively speaking, republican critics of capitalism, contem-
porary or otherwise, tend to suggest two sorts of things. On the one hand, they 
suggest that there is concrete domination in the workplace, in the market, and 
perhaps on an ideological sphere too. On the other hand, some of them suggest 
that there is an abstract form of domination as well. To be sure, such things 
may be expressed independently of one another; indeed, they frequently are 
and were, and not just by republicans either. As Gourevitch shows, many labor 
republicans, for example, condemned capitalist relations only because of servi-
tude within the workplace (Gourevitch 2015). They merely wanted to replace 
domination by capitalists or bosses with collective ownership. They criticized 
concrete manifestations of arbitrary will only and did not pay much attention to 
structural determinations. On the other hand, criticism of abstract domination 
can function very well without criticism of concrete forms. One might easily 
suppose that the logic of the self-valorization of capital may remain existent 
despite the introduction of worker cooperatives, and one might also come to 
the conclusion (and this is merely the other side of the same coin) that cap-
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italist workplaces could serve their purpose without arbitrary interference of 
any sort. Of course, these two perspectives do not have to be separated, on the 
contrary, they may be combined in a carefully mediated way. For instance, it 
may be suggested that the asymmetry at the workplace is itself determined by 
structural power-dispositions. Or, more generally, it might also be concluded 
that “the structural dependence of the wage-laborer was translated, through the 
labor contract, to a more personal form of servitude to the employer” (Goure-
vitch 2020).
5.What Use for the Left? What Polemic Edge Against Liberalism?
But what use does all of this have for the left today? For let us not forget that 
the whole project we sketch above fits into a wider discourse also. This is the 
discourse of a left trying to find its way, experimenting with various theoretical 
tools from Hegelian dialectics all the way to forms of immanent critique and 
the like. The project of anti-capitalist republicanism is but a new episode of this 
long-standing debate. So, what use does it have? The precise answer remains to 
be seen, of course. But still, we raise a few arguments in its favor, as well as pos-
sible objections to it. Of course, historical findings themselves may, sometimes, 
have a subversive nature. Words used in common parlance may be attributed 
new meaning, or more precisely, their original ambiguity may be reattributed 
to them again. The uncovering of the ‘republican Marx’, or that of ‘labor repub-
licanism’ in general could be useful for the left insofar as it potentially weakens 
the narrative according to which such a great tradition as that of republicanism 
belongs to the mainstream only (that is to say, capitalism), but not to its enemies.
Arguably however, the link between republicanism and the (socialist) left 
is defensible not merely historically, but on a normative level also. The two are 
not at odd is principle, in fact as Muldoon shows, they are quite compatible. As 
we have seen, the primary reason for this has to do with the anti-hierarchy, an-
ti-domination content of republicanism, which may indeed be radicalized, and 
turned into a weapon against the capitalist mode of production, the bourgeois 
state and so much more. Muldoon’s article is also a good example to suggest 
that republicanism helps out on a normative level. This is something that the left 
has famously struggled with: what to do instead? What ought to take the place 
of ‘capitalist democracy’? Republicanism provides at least one possible answer: 
any post-capitalist society ought to have a state, albeit a socialist state, one that 
is democratically controlled, dismantles the army, and provides its citizens with 
opportunities for participation in the various self-governing bodies, real owner-
ship over their lives, and immunity from ideological indoctrination and so on.
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All of these things are, however, considered fairly commonplace on the (rad-
ical) left. This is not to say that they are acceptable to everybody therein. It is 
merely to say that they are well known, and also fairly widely accepted. Where 
republicans seem to offer an alternative, therefore, is not so much with regards 
to practical suggestions, but more with regards to their justification. They show, 
in effect, that what is primarily wrong with capitalism is its freedom-restricting 
character. Also, the reason why some of the mentioned socialist practices are to 
be preferred is precisely their ability to enhance freedom itself. So what? Is this 
really all that original? Perhaps on a rather abstract level it is. But practically 
speaking, not particularly. The obvious objection by some leftists could be that if 
republican normativity merely explains why some of the already widely accept-
ed practices might be considered right and justified, then it does not, in effect, 
take us all that far.
Even more serious problems might arise as well, however. Just how close 
is the link between republicanism and the left, the left being understood in a 
rather general way? Is it really the case, as Stuart White seems to suggest, that 
‘leftist’ republicans differ from those on the ‘right’ merely insofar as they actually 
do draw the correct conclusions from their principles, and do not stop halfway? 
(White 2011, 561-579). Is the difference really that they extend the demands 
of the non-domination ideal on the private as well as the public sphere, unlike 
the moderates, who criticize merely public (state) domination? This is actually 
far from obvious. For one, there are good reasons to suggest that market rela-
tions should not be interpreted as dominating at all (Pettit 2006, 131-149). So, 
it is perhaps not so much that outright pro-market republicans (one of whom 
is Hayek, purportedly) are necessarily inconsistent, but rather that they do not 
believe that the left’s solutions really serve their ideals better (see Irving 2020). 
In other words, what they do believe is not necessarily that certain forms of 
domination are acceptable while others are not, but rather that pro-market pol-
icies reduce overall domination far better than state intervention does, not to 
mention the abolishing of private property. They may yet be wrong about this. 
But if they are then their position is not inconsistent as republican but merely 
flawed as a description of reality. If they really are wrong, then all pro-market 
advocates are wrong, liberals and conservatives included. But of course, it is far 
from evident that this should be the case. The empirical evidence is famously 
ambiguous – and this is precisely the reason why we still have debates on eco-
nomic policy. Therefore, it is also far from evident that a consistent republican 
ought to be on the left.
One has also to keep in mind that the ‘leftist’ republican project fits into 
yet another discourse too, namely the republican revival itself, which emerged 
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essentially as a critique of liberalism. So, what the ‘leftists’ need to show is not 
merely that their position attains socialist goals, but also that it attains the goals 
any sort of republicanism ought to. What we have in mind of course is providing 
an alternative to so-called mainstream liberalism. Now, this goal might not be 
all that easy to attain, however. Even on a historical level, it is far from obvi-
ous that the republican tradition is somehow closer to the left than liberalism 
is. Ever since the beginning of the 20th century, liberalism has had a powerful 
stream advocating public ownership, strong workers’ rights, redistribution, and 
the like (Ryan 2015, 59-84).
But putting history aside, the problem is also present on a normative level. 
For it is in fact far from obvious that liberal theory is, as is suggested, totally 
insensitive to the freedom-restricting effect of hierarchies. To be fair, liberals do, 
indeed, maintain that freedom itself does not require the absence of such hier-
archies. However, they do not, or probably incredibly rarely do believe that the 
enjoyment of freedom also does not require the absence of severe inequalities. 
Rawls, for one, makes this pretty clear. This is, anyway, the whole point behind 
liberals incorporating an equality-principle into their theories of justice, next to 
the freedom-principle. True, certain (distributive) conceptions of equality are, 
or seem to be insensitive to the domination problem. But perhaps not all of 
them are. Relational conceptions (say, those of Samuel Scheffler, Elizabeth An-
derson, or others) are not for instance. And this might apparently be bad news 
for ‘leftist’ republicans. It might suggest that polemically speaking their project 
is ineffective, for the anti-hierarchy content they believe to be the main advan-
tage of republicanism in general, is in fact not an ‘advantage’ after all. It might 
be, actually, something they could easily agree upon with many contemporary 
liberals. It also might follow that if it is essentially his critique of hierarchies 
that makes Marx a republican, then by the same token, he might also be called 
a liberal too. This would seem to be a rather odd conclusion. Therefore, if they 
are to maintain the polemic edge of their conception (instead of going for mere 
normative attractiveness), then what socialist republicans need to show is that 
there is something about liberalism that makes it utterly incompatible with the 
critique of hierarchies. Something, in other words, that makes the ‘relational’ 
conception of equality in fact non-liberal. We are not familiar with any real at-
tempt to show this. Thus, for now, the onus of proof remains with (socialist) 
republicans.
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